Saturday, June 19, 2010

The Discovery of ‘Animal’ Electricity


Luigi Galvani (1737 – 1798) was an Italian physician and physicist. He demonstrated what we now understand to be the electrical basis of nerve impulses when he made frog muscles twitch. In 1791 he published his theory of animal electricity in the treatise, “Commentary on the Effect of Electricity on Muscular Motion”. Galvani challenged the idea of animal spirit as the cause of nervous activity. He based his conclusion on a series of experiments on amputated frog legs. He had found that he could induce the frog’s leg to twitch by stimulating the ends of the severed nerves.

In one case, during a thunderstorm, he connected a nerve stump to a long metallic wire that pointed to the sky, and obtained muscular contractions. He also found that he could produce movements when he suspended the leg between two different metals. Although he did not know it, he had shown that when dissimilar metals make contact through a salt solution an electrical current is produced (this was the first demonstration of the battery, later formally invented by Volta in 1800).

These discoveries led Galvani to conclude that nerves are capable of conduction electricity and their ‘invisible spirit’ must be electrical in nature. He called the force that activated the muscles ‘animal electricity’. This was one of the first forays into the study of bioelectricity, a field that still today studies the electrical patterns and signals of the nervous system.


Reference:

Wickens, A. (2005). Foundations of Biopsychology (2. Ed.). USA: Prentice Hall.

Heritability


Heritability is a statistic that describes the degree to which genetic differences between individuals cause differences in a property, such as shyness or height (Plomin, DeFries, McClearn, & McGuffin, 2001; Larsen & Buss, 2005).


Formal Definition

The proportion of phenotypic variance that is attributable to genotypic variance. Phenotypic variance refers to individual differences; genotypic variance refers to individual differences in the total collection of genes possessed by each person.


Numerical Value

Heritability can be expressed in numbers. Its numerical value range from 0.0 (genes do not contribute at all to phenotypic individual differences) to 1.0 (genes are the only reason for individual differences). For human behavior, almost all estimates of heritability are in the moderate range of .30 to .60. A heritability of .50 means that 50 percent of the observed phenotypic variation is attributable to genotypic variation. The larger the heritability, the lower the environmentality.


Misconceptions

The most common misconception about heritability is that the concept can be applied to a single individual. It can’t. A heritability of .32 informs us that, on average, 32% of the individual differences that we observe in, say, shyness may in some way be attributable to genetic individual difference. It does NOT mean that 32% of any person's shyness is due to his/her genes and the other 68% is due to his/her environment. It is meaningful to say that individual differences in height are 91 percent heritable, but it makes no sense to say that a specific individual’s height is 91 percent heritable. It is like saying that the first 61 inches of her height are due to genes, and the other 7 inches are due to environment. For an individual, genes and environment are inextricably intertwined. Both play a role in determining height and they cannot be separated. Thus, heritability refers only to differences in a sample or population.


Reference:

Larsen, R. J. & Buss, D. M. (2005). Personality Psychology: Domains of Knowledge about Human Nature. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Tuesday, June 15, 2010

Livssynssymboler i Rettssaler


I en hårreisende avgjørelse har Domstoladministrasjonen bestemt at det ikke vil bli forbud mot religiøse og politiske symboler i norske domstoler. Ifølge styret må problemstillinger knyttet til slike symboler løses ved holdningsarbeid, og hvis partene i en rettsforhandling har innvendinger mot bruk av slike symboler, må det tas opp gjennom inhabilitetsbestemmelsene.

Man kan godt spørre seg om det da er tillatt for en dommer å møte opp i Bandidos-jakke eller med hakekors. Fordi enten må alle symboler tillates, eller alle forbys, eller så må grensen trekkes et annet sted – og hvor bør da gå? Kan et jurymedlem stille opp i burka, eller en rettsbetjent i niqab? Og, hva vil skje den dagen en tiltalt muslimsk kvinne med hijab stiller i retten og møter en dommer med den jødiske kippaen på hodet?

Forestill deg at en Brann-supporter møter opp i retten fordi han har slått ned en Rosenborg-supporter. Supporteren er ikledd Brann-drakt, entrer lokalet, og får sjokk når han ser at dommeren er ikledd Rosenborg-drakt. Ville det være urimelig for den tiltalte å klage over dommers inhabilitet? Og hvis kun det å indikere en estetisk preferanse – i dette eksempelet hvilket fotballag man heier på – ser ut til å være uakseptabelt, kan det neppe være mindre urovekkende med religiøse og politiske symboler.

Det har blitt hevdet at bruk av, for eksempel, hijab ikke vil påvirke en persons objektivitet eller nøytralitet. Men vi vet fra psykologisk forskning at bekledning kan påvirke atferd, både vår egen og hvordan andre opptrer mot oss. Dette gjelder spesielt plagg som symboliserer en bestemt rolle, som er assosiert med visse holdninger og atferdsmønster. Husker du hvordan det var å ikle seg russe-genseren, og hvordan, nesten på magisk vis, mange inhibisjoner forduftet. Russ forventes å finne på sprell, og drakten assosieres med denne forventningen. Vi vet at slike forventninger kan ha betydelig innvirkning på individers atferd.

At representanter for statsmakten skal kunne bruke synlige religiøse eller politiske symbol under utøvning av yrket sitt er uforenlig med elementære rettsstatlige prinsipp. Statsmakten skal være livssynsnøytral, og derfor følger det at de som representerer statsmakten skal være livssynsnøytrale. Livssyn er en privatsak. Ved sin nøytralitet verner statsmakten om enkeltindividets rett livssynsfrihet. Fjerner man nøytraliteten, bryter man ned et rettsstatlig skille mellom privatsfære og statsmakt, og man fjerner et vilkår for livssynsfrihet.

At representanter for statsmakten ikke markerer sine livssynspreferanser er nødvendig for at de skal kunne utføre sin yrkesfunksjon uten å bli oppfattet som representanter for noe annet enn staten. Representanter for statsmakten skal opptre på en måte som inngir respekt og tillit, og følge prinsipper som ikke gir tvil om objektivitet og nøytralitet. Dersom religiøse eller politiske symboler benyttes i retten, kan det skape mistanke om at forutinntatte holdninger påvirker domsavgjørelsen. Denne mistanken vil dermed tære på respekten og tilliten til rettssystemet.

Derfor skal dommere, osv. opptre i plagg som fremhever deres nøytralitet og objektivitet. De skal utøve en bestemte rollefunksjon og overholde de krav som stilles i tjenesten; de skal ikke opptre som privatpersoner og fronte personlige preferanser. Altså må personlige preferanser vike for rollekravene.

Man kan derfor ikke forsvare bruk av religiøse symboler ved prinsippet om religionsfrihet. Det er en menneskerett å velge og å utøve det livssyn man selv ønsker; men det er ikke en menneskerett å bli det man ønsker. Den enkeltes ønske om å bære symboler som hijab, turban, kipa og kors må vike for det grunnleggende hensynet til at domstolene fremtrer objektivt og nøytralt. Hvis du ikke klarer å legge fra deg dine religiøse symboler hjemme før du går på jobb, hvordan du da ikke la personlige preferanser påvirke din objektivitet?

Konklusjonen bør være åpenbar: det skal være uniformsplikt som gjelder for alle representanter for staten. Alle religiøse eller politiske symboler bør forbys der statens ansatte bærer uniform eller utøver makt på statens vegne. Fagdommere, aktor, protokollførere, saksbehandlere, jurymedlemmer, og rettsbetjenter må ha en nøytral påkledning når de opptrer i retten.

Tuesday, June 8, 2010

TED: Svitak - "What Adults Can Learn from Kids"


Child prodigy Adora Svitak says the world needs "childish" thinking: bold ideas, wild creativity and optimism.


Myth: Israel has Denied the Palestinians Statehood


• In 1937, the Peel Commission concluded that Palestine should be partitioned into separate Jewish and Arab states. The Arabs rejected the plan because they did not want the Jews to have their own state. They also refused to consider any compromises.

• When the U.N. partitioned Palestine, several Arab nations launched an aggressive war against the newborn Jewish state.

• From 1948-67, the West Bank was occupied by Jordan and Gaza was occupied by Egypt. But they never set up a Palestinian state. King Abdullah I of Jordan refused to give the Palestinians independence, but offered them Jordanian citizenship. Gaza was given no real authority by the Egyptian government. In 1959, Egypt's new leader Gamal Abdul Nasser refused to grant Palestinians Egyptian citizenship.

• The 1979 Egypt-Israel peace negotiations offered the Palestinians autonomy.

• The Oslo process that began in 1993 was leading toward the creation of a Palestinian state until the Palestinians violated their commitments. Yasser Arafat called the Oslo-agreement a hudna – a temporary truce. Arafat resurrected Hamas to spearhead the Al-Aqsa Intifada. He was a Puppet Master, fighting Israel safely from backstage; getting others to light the fuse, and then accused them of blocking the road to peace.

• In 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered to create a Palestinian state, but Yasser Arafat rejected the deal. It has been claimed that the deal was unjust and that Arafat was right to turn it down. But he never even offered a counterproposal.

TED: Sandel - "The Lost Art of Democratic Debate"



Monday, June 7, 2010

The Gaza Flotilla Raid


The Gaza flotilla raid was carried out by Israeli naval forces on one of the six ships of the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” in May 2010. The ships, carrying 663 pro-Palestinian activists from 37 countries, attempted to transport supplies to Gaza and to thereby break the Israeli-Egyptian Gaza blockade. The ship was boarded in international waters because the ship refused to redirect its course. The boarding of five of the ships passed without serious incident, but the boarding of the MV Mavi Marmara turned violent when activists aboard attacked the Israeli soldiers. Nine activists were killed, and ten Israeli soldiers were injured (Wikipedia, 2010).


The Raid Was Legal

Some Israeli lawyers claimed that the raid on the flotilla violated international law (Izenberg, 2010). However, according to most experts, the boarding in international waters was legal (Wikipedia, 2010).

When Israel ended the occupation of Gaza, the terrorism organization Hamas seized control and functions as a de facto government, which means that they have the primary responsibility for the welfare of the Palestinian people. But Hamas have engaged in warfare against Israel – nearly 10,000 anti-personnel rockets have been launched against civilian targets, which all constitute war crimes - and both Isreal and Egypt responded by declaring a blockade, the purpose of which was to assure that no material that can be used for making war was permitted into Gaza. Israel allowed humanitarian aid through its checkpoints. This blockade is legal according to several experts (Wikipedia, 2010). Ed Morgan, professor of international law at the University of Toronto, explains:

A blockade of an enemy’s coast is an established military tactic. It is recognized as a means at the Security Council’s disposal under Article 42 of the UN Charter where collective action is authorized...

A naval blockade is defined in Article 7.71 of the U.S. Naval Handbook as “a belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all nations, enemy as well as neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation.” It is designed to stop ships from crossing a cordon separating the enemy’s coast from the high seas. It is therefore often enforced in what would otherwise be international waters approaching, but not necessarily inside, the territorial sea of the blockaded party.

The San Remo conference set the specific rules for implementing a blockade. It must be publicly declared and notification sent to all states whose vessels are likely to be nearby. Further, the blockade must be effective. International law permits no fictitious blockade designed to frighten away third-party ships...A maritime blockade is for security purposes only, and must allow humanitarian assistance to the civilian population.


Since the blockade is legal, and the ship intended to break it, then Israel has a right to inspect the ships to uncover whether they carry things that is in violation of the rules of the blockade, such as weapons (Haslien, 2010). The blockade may be enforced before the offending ships cross the line into domestic waters. Several other western countries have frequently boarded ships at high sea in order to assure their security (Dershowitz, 2010).

The rule of proportionate force applies to a naval blockade. Blockading navies are obliged to arrest a ship rather than simply fire on it, and once its soldiers are on board an arrested ship their actions must be proportionate to the threat that they meet (Morgan, 2010). The act of breaking a military siege is itself a military act, and those knowingly participating in such action put in doubt their status as non-combatants. And the moment these activists picked up a weapon and began to attack Israeli soldiers, they lost their status as innocent civilians. Even under ordinary civilian rules of self defense, everybody has a right to protect themselves and others from attack by knife and pipe wielding assailants (Dershowitz, 2010).


There Was No Humanitarian Crisis or Aid

A humanitarian crisis can be defined as an event or series of events which represents a critical threat to the health, safety, security or wellbeing of a community or other large group of people. Armed conflicts, epidemics, famine, natural disasters, etc. may involve or lead to such crisis.

Gaza receives more aid per person, per square mile, than anywhere else in the world, and suffers no lack of humanitarian aid (Geller, 2010). Many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza live a middle class (and in some cases an upper class) lifestyle (Gross, 2010). Tuesday, 18. May, there was an opening of an Olympic size swimming pool in Gaza (Ma’an News Agency, 2010). Daily life, while troubled, often has the quality of the very ordinary (Bronner, 2010). Of course, there is poverty and unemployment. But it is false that the majority is starving in Gaza, and that it is all Israel’s fault. Reporter Steffen Jensen visited Gaza 01. June, 2010:

This time, I had expected to see real suffering...No food. Long queues in front of UN food stocks. Hungry children with food bowls. However, it was not the picture that greeted me...When I yesterday morning drove through Gaza City, I was immediately surprised that there are almost as many traffic jams as there always has been. Is there not a shortage of fuel? Apparently not...I went to Shati refugee camp, also known as Beach Camp...Here is one of Gaza's many vegetable markets that sell much more than just fruits and vegetables. I will not say whether, in better times has been a larger product range than there were yesterday. But there was certainly no shortage of vegetables, fruits or any other ordinary, basic foods. Tomatoes, cucumbers, corn, watermelons, potatoes - all in the mountains at the many stalls. I must admit I was a little surprised. I must admit. Because when I call down here to my Palestinian friends, so they tell me about all the problems and deficiencies, so I expected that the crisis was a little more clear.


The biggest problem is the lack of jobs and a sustainable domestic economy. This means that many people have no income, but must live on charity from their relatives. They cannot afford to buy the goods that are actually available (Jensen, 2010).

There are many problems indeed. There is a shortage of building materials. But it is not lack of food. And this economic development must come from within. All this means that the Hamas must soften its total refusal to negotiate with Israel, and recognize its right to exist. But Hamas announced that they will not even accept the humanitarian aid from the Gaza flotilla! (Jensen, 2010)

So, when the activists portrayed themselves as humanitarians, that was just deception. There was no humanitarian aid on the Mavi Marmara! Four ships had equipment (the Gaza, the Sofia, the Defney and the Rachel Corrie), the rest had only passengers (Ronen, 2010). Flotilla spokeswoman Greta Berlin announced last week that: "This mission is not about delivering humanitarian supplies, it's about breaking Israel's siege." (Mowbray, 2010).





Passengers were Jihadists

The flotilla was sponsored by, amongst others, IHH, an associate of Hamas and a member of the Union of the Good. This Union is headed by Yousef Al Qaradawi, one of the world’s most notorious Islamic terrorists (banned in England and America) and leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. IHH is a jihadist group cloaked in a humanitarian outfit. It has played a role in terrorist operations and it has been involved in weapons trafficking. Israel tried speaking to the group before they left the dock and then again while at sea. In an attempt to avoid confrontation, they hoped to persuade the IHH Flotilla to dock at the Israeli port of Ashdod for inspection before delivering the goods to Gaza. Israel had nothing to gain from a confrontation – but the IHH did. These “humanitarians” were jihadists (Gabriel, 2010).


The Jihadists were Hateful, Agressive, and Violent

Participants chanted about killing Jews:



When modern-day jihadists invoke Khaybar, they are recalling an aggressive, surprise raid by Muhammad which resulted in the final eradication of the once considerable Jewish presence in Arabia. Khaybar was an oasis inhabited by Jews which was violently attacked by Islam’s founder Muhammad and his Muslim force. The attack was not a response to any provocation. According to Muslim biographers of Muhammad, he personally killed several Jewish men. Jewish leader, Kinana bin al-Rabi was brought before Muhammad because he was supposed to know where the groups treasure was. Kinana denied knowing where it was, and Muhammad threatened to kill him. Some of the treasure was found. To find the rest, Muhammad gave orders to torture Kinana. One of the Muslims built a fire on Kinana's chest, but Kinana did not give up his secret. When he was at the point of death, one of the Muslims beheaded him. Kinana's wife was taken as a war prize; Muhammad claimed her for himself. Muhammad agreed to let the people of Khaybar to go into exile, allowing them to keep as much of their property as they could carry (Spencer, 2010).

These hateful activists attacked the Israeli soldiers immediately - even before they could reach the deck – with knives and bats, and other things they used as weapons. They grabbed soldiers and stripped them of their helmets and equipment. The force threw several stun grenades, but the violent attacks continued. The soldiers had been instructed to refrain from using their sidearms unless their lives were at risk. Soldiers feared for their lives, asked permission to open fire. Two soldiers were wounded, and some of the activists succeeded in stealing one of their guns. Shots were fired, and one of the soldiers fell to the ground. Fearing for their lives, the soldiers asked and received permission to open fire.




The Violent Jihadists are Responsible

No country would allow a ship to break their blockade. Thus, stopping the flotilla was a must. The activists knew this, but would not agree to a peaceful compromise. Fair warnings were given by the Israeli force before boarding. In the beginning they did not use deadly force.

Was there a way for the Israeli force to achieve its goal without killing passengers? Probably. They could, for example, have used water cannons to clear the deck before boarding the ship. The soldiers were clearly unprepared and therefore miscalculated. The commandos didn’t seem to know they were going to face an angry mob armed with bats and knives. The soldiers were surprised by the jihadists; they saw their friends being lynched; they acted as any soldier would have and should have acted. To save their fellow soldiers, they opened fire (Rosner, 2010).

The boarding was a fiasco according to several Israeli media. No other nation wears a target on its back the way Israel does. Israeli officials know their every action will be scrutinized and dissected under the media microscope, which makes their failure to plan for angry mobs greeting their soldiers as they boarded the flotilla mystifying. Most Israelis think the situation should have been handled differently (Mowbray, 2010). But the soldiers can hardly be blamed for defending themselves and each other. The violent jihadists must bear the responsibility for both provoking the situation and then forcing the soldiers to use their firearms.


Conclusion:

The biased media coverage of this incident was staggering. Even before anyone knew what really happened on Mavi Marmara, several media and top politicians had begun condemning the "unlawful" raid by IDF on the "humanitarian" flotilla and its "peace-loving" passengers. As we have seen, the opposite is true. The raid was lawful; there was no humanitarian aid on Mavi Marmara; and their intentions were anything but peace-loving.


Reference:

Bronner, E. (2010, 11. June). Gaza, Through Fresh Eyes. New York Times.

Dershowitz, A. (2010, 01. June). Israel's Actions Were Entirely Lawful Though Probably Unwise.

Gabriel, B. (2010, 03. June). Jihad in humanitarian clothing.

Geller, P. (2010, 01. June). Another Two Warships in Anti-Humanitarian Flotilla Make their Way to the Jewish State.

Gross, T. (2010, 25. May). Fancy restaurants and Olympic-size pools: What the media won’t report about Gaza.

Haslien, R. (2010, 04. June). Engasjerende og opplysende debatt i NRK.

Izenberg, D. (2010, 31. May). Isreali lawyers: Raid violates int'l law.

Jensen, S. (2010, 02. June). Situationen i Gaza: Problemet mere mangel på arbejde end på mad.

Ma’an News Agency (2010, 18. May). Gaza opens first Olympic-size swimming pool.

Morgan, E. (2010). Israel’s naval blockade pitches and rolls with the Law of the Sea.

Mowbray, J. (2010, 02. June). Freedom Flotilla flotsam.

Ronen, G. (2010, 10. June). It's Official: There was No Humanitarian Aid on Mavi Marmara.

Rosner, S. (2010, 01. June). What's To Investigate?

Spencer, R. (2010, 31. May). Gaza jihad flotilla participants chanted Islamic battle cry invoking Muhammad's massacre of Jews.

Wikipedia – Gaza Flotilla Raid

Myth: Israel has engaged in Genocide


Genocide is intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, political or religious group by killing members of the group and/or deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its destruction. A massacre can be defined as the indiscriminate slaughter of people.

Israel is, at least, partly responsible for some massacres:

• Qana, 1996: Israeli artillery struck the Unifil Headquarters in Qana which was providing shelter to more than 800 Lebanese civilians. 106 were killed and around 116 injured. Hezbollah fighters had fired Katyusha rockets and mortars from the site, and the IDF responded with shelling. Greater care should have been taken to secure that no civilians was in the area, but Hezbollah must also be blamed for violating the rules of war.

• Qana, 2006: An estimated 28 Lebanese civilians were killed when the Israeli Air Force dropped two bombs on their shelter. Jihadist gunmen had used the shelter to launch rockets from the roof, and thus it was deemed a military target by the IDF.

• September 1982: Refugees are killed by the Christian Lebanese Forces militia in refugee camps surrounded by Israel Defense Forces. This was an act of massacre that Israel was at least indirectly responsible for.

• The battle of Jenin: An estimated 55 Palestinians died, 22 of them civilians according to Human Rights Watch, and some of these deaths constituted war crimes. The refugee camp was targeted after Israel determined that it had served as a launch site for terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, which all of them constitutes war crimes. Actually, many military experts consider the battle of Jenin a model of how to conduct urban warfare against terrorists hiding among civilians because the number of civilian deaths was low compared to similar cases, such as in the Second Chechen War.


The enemies of Israel are responsible for at least 5 massacres on civilians:

• May 30, 1972: Three members of the Japanese Red Army, on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, killed 26 people and injured 80 others at Tel Aviv's Lod airport (now Ben Gurion International Airport).

• May 15, 1974: Members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine shoot and kill a Christian Arab woman and a Jewish couple and their 4 year old son, and then take hostage and kill 22 high school students and three of their adult escorts.

• March 11, 1978: Palestinian Fatah members based in Lebanon land on a beach north of Tel Aviv, kill an American photographer, and hijack an inter-city bus driving along Israel's Coastal Highway. 35 civilians are killed and 80 wounded.

• January 22, 1995: First suicide attack by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, killing 22 and wounding 69. Carried out by two bombers; the second waited until emergency crews arrived to assist the wounded and dying before detonating his bomb.

• March 27, 2002: Killing of 30 guests at the Park Hotel in Netanya, Israel, sitting down to the traditional Passover Seder meal. Another 143 were injured. Hamas claimed responsibility.


From September 2000 to March 2003, approximately 20 % of the nearly 2,000 Palestinians killed by Israeli forces were civilians. This is a low ratio, compared to other similar conflicts, and thus proof that Israel is not deliberately targeting civilians. If they had, they must be totally incompetent, because the IDF would have no problem committing genocide due to its military capacity.

Actually, few other nations in a comparable situation have been more protective of enemy civilians. The ethical code of the Israeli army was compiled with the assistance of some of the country's leading moral philosophers. It commands every soldier to avoid causing harm to civilians.

On the other side, militant jihadists have expressed a desire to kill civilian Israelis; Israel has never expressed a desire to kill civilian Palestinians. Palestinian fighters have often engaged in terrorism, and several groups, such as Hamas, glorify the killing of innocent civilians. These groups have had support from several Arab nations, both financial and ideological. During the 1948-war, the expressed goal of the Arab armies was to commit genocide, and during the 1967 war, the armies of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq targeted Israeli civilians.

Of course, Israel often make mistakes and overreacts, and is justly criticized when they do wrong, but its overall record is still among the best in the world.

Myth: Jews have no claim to Palestine

There are several good reasons why the Jews have a claim to the Land of Israel:

1. The Jewish people settled and developed the land.
2. The Jewish people have maintained ties to Palestine for more than 3,700 years.
3. The international community granted political sovereignty in Palestine to the Jewish people.

The ancient Hebrews entered the Land of Israel about 1300 B.C.E. They lived under a tribal confederation, until being united under the first monarch, King Saul. The second king, David, established Jerusalem as the capital around 1000 B.C.E. The nation was divided under Solomon’s son, with the northern kingdom lasting until 722 B.C.E., when the Assyrians destroyed it, and the southern kingdom surviving until the Babylonian conquest in 586 B.C.E. Most Jews were driven from their homeland in 135 C.E. If not for foreign conquerors, Israel would be more than 3,000 years old today.

Palestine has never been an Arab or Muslim state. Muslim Palestinians can only claim an historic connection to Palestine of circa 1000 years, dating back to the Muslim conquest in the 7th century.

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, the British got mandate over the area, and in 1917, they issued a declaration that promised the land to the Jewish people:

His Majesty’s Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.


In 1947, the UN established a Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) to devise a solution to the partition of Palestine. Delegates of seven nations recommended the establishment of two separate states, one Jewish and one Arab, with Jerusalem as an internationalized enclave. The Jews accepted the offer, the Arabs rejected it.

Myths about the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict



Jews have no claim to the land they call Israel

• Israel created the Palestinian refugee problem

• Israel has not made Serious Efforts at Peace

Israel has Denied the Palestinians statehood

Israel has engaged in Genocide


“The great enemy of truth is very often not the lie – deliberate, contrived and dishonest – but the myth – persistent, persuasive and repeated” – John F. Kennedy

Sunday, June 6, 2010

The Third Jihad



Hamas


Hamas er gren av Det Muslimske Brorskap (den største islamistiske bevegelsen i verden, som ens ultimate mål er å islamisere hele verden). Hamas rolle og mål er å eliminere staten Israel. I sine forsøk på å oppnå målet tar Hamas i bruk en rekke midler, deriblant terrorisme, barnemishandling og propaganda.


Om Islam: Dens Rolle og Innvirkning

I Hamas’ eget partiprogram står det at organisasjonen ”henter sine retningslinjer fra islam, avleder fra den sin tenkning, tolkning og sitt syn på tilværelsen, livet og menneskeheten…og blir inspirert av islam i alle avgjørelser den tar.”

Hamas identifiserer seg selv som en muslimsk organisasjon. Koranen og andre muslimske tekster blir sitert flere ganger i Partiprogrammet. Hvorvidt alle deres tolkninger av tekstene er rimelige kan diskuteres.

Hamas hevder at bare ”under islams skygge kan tilhengere av alle religioner leve side om side i harmoni og med sikkerhet for sine liv, eiendeler og rettigheter. I islams fravær oppstår konflikter, undertrykkelse blir vanlig, korrupsjon tar overhånd og oppvigleri og krig hører til dagens orden…”


Om Jihad

Ifølge Hamas er kampen mot Israel ”pålagt” alle ”jihad-kjempere” av Allah. Alle ”sjeler vil forene seg med alle de jihad-krigere som har ofret sine liv …” Hamas mener altså at en perfekt skaper av universet har pålagt dem å kjempe og at de som dør i denne kampen vil komme til et perfekt sted som belønning. Hamas forstår Jihad i kontekst av Hasan Al-Banna sin tolkning av Koranen og tradisjonene om Muhammeds ytringer og gjerninger. Al-Banna grunnla Det Muslimske Brorskap og skriver i ”Jihad” (1928):

“Jihad is an obligation from Allah on every Muslim...Allah has ascribed great importance to jihad and has made the reward of the martyrs and the fighters in His way a splendid one...The weaknesses of abstention and evasion of jihad are regarded by Allah as one of the major sins...Islam is concerned with the question of jihad and the drafting and the mobilization of the entire Umma {the global Muslim community} into one body to defend the right cause with all its strength...The verses of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of Muhammad...are overflowing with all these noble ideals and they summon people in general...to jihad, to warfare, to the armed forces, and all means of land and sea fighting.”(I: Jihad Watch, 2008).

I Hamas’ partiprogram står det også: "...Jihad innebærer ikke bare å frakte våpen og sverte fienden, å komme med positive kommentarer, skrive gode artikler og nyttige bøker og gi en hjelpende hånd er også jihad, slik Allah har anvist, så lenge hensikten er et oppriktig ønske om å gjøre hans banner enerådende.” Altså, alle midler som fører nærmere målet om å islamisere verden er jihad. Dette inkluderer de sosiale tiltakene til Hamas. For eksempel, lover de å gi betydelig økonomisk støtte til familien til unge muslimer hvis de blir martyrbombere (Stern, 2004).


Det Muslimske Brorskap

Hamas er ”en av vingene til De muslimske brødrene i Palestina. Den muslimske brorskapsbevegelsen er en verdensomspennende organisasjon og den største islamske bevegelsen i moderne tid. Den er kjennetegnet av dyp refleksjon, av presise forestillinger og av en helhetlig forståelse av alle sider ved islam i alle livets avskygninger: livssyn og tro, politikk og økonomi, utdanning og samfunn, rettssystem og regler, indoktrinering og undervisning, kunst og publikasjoner, i det skjulte og det åpenbarte og på alle andre livsområder.”

I 1991 ble det rapportert at Det Muslimske Brorskaps “work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions.” (The Investigative Project on Terrorism, 2009).


Barnemishandling

Hamas legitimerer ”indoktrinering” av barn. Indoktrinering er en sterk form for sosialisering av et barn foruten noen form for rasjonell prosess hvor hovedmålet er at barnet skal akseptere visse meninger, samt at disse meninger skal være så motstandsdyktige mot endring som mulig. Dette har den psykologiske effekt på barnets sinn at de blir dogmatiske og mister nesten hele sin evne til intellektuelt å analysere de indoktrinerte meningene. Indoktrinering handler ikke om sannhet eller bevisførsel, og er dermed det helt motsatte av undervisning. På grunn av dette er indoktrinering både et grovt brudd på barns rettigheter til selvbestemmelse og undervisning, men også psykologisk mishandling (Humphrey, 1998; Winn, 2000).

Hamas bruker indoktrinering i den hensikt å få støttespillere for sin sak, og tar derfor for seg barna fra de fødes fordi de vet at barn ikke har mental eller fysisk kapasitet til å stå imot dem. Hamas vet at hvis ”åndsfellesskap råder, vil fellesskapsfølelsen bli dypere og samarbeidsviljen og medfølelsen få bedre råderom. Følelsen av fellesskap vil styrkes, og de militære rekkene vil bli sterkere i møte med fienden.” Derfor har Hamas, for eksempel, arrangert ”sommercamp” for barn fra alderen 8 til 17 år. Mange arabisk-palestinske foreldre trakk barna fra campen etter at de fikk vite at Hamas lærte barna å bruke våpen og sitere voldelige koranvers. Hamas ble beskyldt fra flere hold for å ha ”hjernevasket” barna og lært dem ”hat” (Jihad Watch, 2007).

Men Hamas mener dette må gjøres for å ”rense ut alle spor etter den ideologiske invasjonen,” og at hele det muslimske samfunnet ”må delta i denne bevisstgjøringen” ved for eksempel ”å innføre fundamentale forandringer i skolenes pensum.” Noe av det de vil endre i pensum er uten tvil historiske fakta om Palestina.


Om Det Britiske Palestinamandatet

”[Hamas] tror at landet Palestina har vært en islamsk waqf gjennom alle generasjoner og vil være det inntil oppstandelsens dag.”

Det har aldri eksistert noen stat som har blitt kalt Palestina. Gjennom historien har ”Palestina” blitt brukt om et område i Midtøsten med varierende omfavn. Palestina blitt brukt om et område som inkluderer dagens Israel, de palestinske territoriene, Jordan, samt deler av Libanon og Syria. I en mer snever bruk, omfatter Palestina kun Israel, de palestinske territoriene; et område som før Første Verdenskrig var dette området en del av det Ottomanske riket.

Under Frøste Verdenskrig ble det Ottomanske riket beseiret og delt opp blant seiersherrene. Storbritannia fikk da mandat over et område som de kalte Palestina. Etter Andre Verdenskrig ble området oppdelt i en arabisk og en jødisk stat av en komité opprettet av FN. Denne to-stats-løsningen ble godkjent med 33 stemmer for, 13 mot og 10 blanke. Jødene godtok oppdelingen, men det gjorde ikke muslimene eller de fem arabiske landene som da var FN-medlemmer.

Jødene erklærte staten Israel som en uavhengig nasjon 15. mai, 1948. I Deklarasjonen står det blant annet: ”We appeal ... to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.”

Israel ble raskt anerkjent av Sovjetunionen, USA og mange andre land, men ikke av de omkransende arabiske statene. Bare timer etter Israel ble en stat ble de angrepet av Libanon, Syria, Irak og Egypt krig, samt frivillige fra Saudi Arabia, Libya og Yemen. De arabiske statene erklærte offentlig at de anså FNs oppdeling som ugyldig og at deres mål var å opprette en arabisk stat over hele området (Wikipedia, 2008). Det er dette målet Hamas forsøker å oppnå.
Ifølge Hamas kan ingen ”gi avkall på det, en del av det eller oppgi det eller en del av det...Dette er statusen til et land som hører inn under islamsk sharialov, og den samme lov gjelder for alle land som er erobret av islam med makt og på den måten blitt waqf-land som følge av erobringen.”

De første muslimene kom til regionen i 634, erobret Jerusalem i 638, og fikk kontroll over et større område. Jødene har hatt tilknytning til dette området i over 3000 år. Hamas skyter seg også i foten ved å argumentere at området tilhører muslimer med den begrunnelse at de en gang i tiden erobret det. For hvis de ikke skal være hyklerske, må de tillate jødene å anvende samme prinsipp, og dermed er de territoriene som Israel råder over legitimt jødisk, siden de var den siste ”erobrende makt” til å ta kontroll over dem. Ifølge deres egen logikk må de altså erobre landet tilbake ved krigføring.

Hamas hevder også at Jerusalem er en hellig muslimsk by fordi det er ”stedet der profeten…steg opp til himmelen” og siterer Koranen (kapittel 17, vers 1). Det er imidlertid flere Islam-eksperter som hevder at Jerusalem egentlig ikke nevnes i Koranen, og at det er ikke noe som tilsier at Muhammed noen gang var i Jerusalem (Fitzgerald, 2006). Men for Hamas er verset tydeligvis tilfredsstillende til å kunne kreve Jerusalem.


Om Målsetningene for Jihad

Hamas er fiender av alle som står i bevegelsens ”vei for å hindre den i sin virksomhet.” Hamas ”bestreber seg på å løfte Allahs banner over hele Palestina” og å ”fjerne ondskapen (Sionismen) ved å knuse den og å overvinne den slik at sannheten (Islam) kan råde grunnen alene.” Hvilket nødvendigvis betyr utslettelse av Israel. I tillegg kjemper Hamas for å ”å utbre sin religion over hele kloden og kjemper for seier ved å styrke sin posisjon og ved å oppfordre til jihad…” Jihad skal føres ”uansett hvor lang tid det vil ta.” Tilsynelatende har de ikke noen intensjon om å legge ned våpnene. Hamas siterer en tradisjon hvor Muhammed skal ha sagt at: ”Den forjettede tid vil først komme når muslimene tar kampen opp mot jødene og dreper dem…(sitat etter Bukhari og Muslim).” ”[Hamas] vil ikke spare noen anstrengelser for å fremme sannhet (Islam) og fjerne ondskap (Sionismen), i tale og i handling, både her og på hvilket som helst sted der bevegelsen kan nå frem og utøve innflytelse.” At de ikke vil spare noen anstrengelser vises ved deres legitimering av drap på sivile Israelere, med den begrunnelse at alle ”som forbereder et angrep…regnes som deltakere i angrepet selv om de ikke har vært med på det” og de ” som oppdrar en kriger i hjemmet sitt, regnes som en som selv deltok i angrepet.”


Om Forhandlinger

På grunn av at Hamas er innstilt på å gjenerobre hele Palestinamandatet eliminerer de muligheten for quid pro quo forhandlinger. Ifølge Hamas ”finnes ingen løsning på” konflikten ”uten gjennom jihad” og derfor er ”internasjonale konferanser” bare ”bortkastet tid.” Hamas anser Camp Davis-avtalene som ”forræderske” og var sterke motstandere av Oslo-avtalen, som de forsøkte å ødelegge (Wikipedia, 2008b). Hamas vil trolig kun utnytte slike forhandlinger til å få Israel til å godkjenne noen av deres krav, og så lure Israel til å tro at de vil selv opprettholde sin del av avtalen.

Ifølge Hamas står ”fredsløsninger, og de internasjonale konferanser som skal løse” konflikten mellom Israel og de palestinske territoriene ”i motsetning til det [Hamas] satser på.” Hamas har ”ingen tro på at (de internasjonale) konferansene verken er i stand til å imøtekomme kravene eller gjeninnføre rettigheter eller skape rettferdighet for de undertrykte.” Hamas anser ”konferansene” som ”et middel til å utnevne vantro mennesker til meklere i islamsk landområde,” og stiller spørsmål ved når har ”de vantro noensinne møtt de troende med rettferdighet?” Vel, muslimer i Israel nyter faktisk flere rettigheter enn de gjør i noe muslimsk land (FNs Utviklingsprogram, 2006).

Men ifølge Hamas vil ikke jøder eller kristne ”bli fordøyd med” muslimer før de ”går over til deres tro.” Hamas siterer deretter Koranen, kapittel 2, vers 120, som sier: ”Og jødene vil ikke bli fornøyd med dere, heller ikke de kristne, før dere går over til deres tro. Utbryt: Sannelig, Allah er vår veileder! Og hvis dere skulle komme til å godta deres ønsker etter at dere har lært sannheten å kjenne, vil dere ikke få noen beskyttende venn eller hjelper av Allah.” Og senere siteres kapittel 3, vers 12: ”Si (O, Muhammed) til de som ikke tror: Dere skal bli overvunnet og kastet i helvete, et smertefullt hvilested.”


Om Nasjonalisme

Ifølge Hamas er ”nasjonalisme” en ”fast bestanddel av den religiøse tro” og ikke noe er ”dypere i nasjonalismen enn det å føre krig mot fienden og konfrontere ham når han setter føttene på muslimenes land. Og dette blir en individuell plikt som binder enhver muslimsk mann og kvinne. En kvinne må gå ut og slåss mot fienden til og med uten ektemannens velsignelse og en slave uten å ha innhentet sin herres tillatelse”

Hva er det kvinner og slaver trenger tillatelse til da? Dette lukter kjønnsdiskriminering og slaveri! Videre står det i partiprogrammet til Hamas:

”Mens andre former for nasjonalisme legger vekt på det materielle, for eksempel menneskelige og territorielle betraktninger, innebærer Hamas forståelse av nasjonalisme, i tillegg til alt dette, de helt avgjørende guddommelige faktorer som tilfører nasjonalismen sin ånd og sitt liv.”

Altså, nasjonalisme foruten Islam er tomt. For Hamas er dette fundamentalt et spørsmål om religion, ikke territorium pr se. Hamas anser ”[a]vståelse av en eneste del av Palestina” som en ”avståelse av en del av religionen.”


Om Kvinners Rolle

Om kvinner står det i Partiprogrammet til Hamas:

”Muslimske kvinner har ikke noen mindre rolle enn menn i frihetskrigen. De produserer menn og spiller en stor rolle i å lede og oppdra den nye generasjon. Fiendene har forstått den rollen de har. Derfor er de klar over at hvis de kan lede og oppdra den muslimske kvinnen på en måte som distanserer henne fra islam, kan de vinne krigen. Du kan se at de gjør vedvarende anstrengelser i den retning ved hjelp av markedsføring og filmer, pensa, opplæring og kultur…Kvinnene i hjemmet skal oppdra sine sønner slik at de etterlever de religiøse påbud som en forberedelse til jihad-plikten som venter sønnene. Vi må derfor være oppmerksomme på skolene og pensaene som er retningsgivende for muslimske kvinners oppdragelse, slik at vi gjør dem til rettskafne mødre som er bevisste på sine plikter i frihetskrigen.”


Om Israel

Ifølge Hamas er Israel ”en ondskapsfull, naziliknende fiende, som ikke skjelner mellom mann og kvinne, gammel og ung…Vår fiende praktiserer kollektiv avstraffelse når de plyndrer folks hjemland og eiendeler, og forfølger dem når de blir jaget ut i eksil til steder der de har samlet seg. Fienden har tydd til beinknusing, åpnet ild mot kvinner og barn og de gamle, med og uten grunn, og de har opprettet fangeleirer hvor tusenvis er blitt internert under umenneskelige forhold. I tillegg ødelegger de hus, gjør barn foreldreløse og avgir undertrykkende rettsavgjørelser overfor tusenvis av unge mennesker som tilbringer sine beste ungdomsår i mørke fangehull…I deres grusomme militæraksjoner skjender de folk på samme måte som de mest avskyelige krigsforbrytelser. Å jage mennesker ut av landet er en annen måte å drepe dem på.”

Hamas hevder at Israel ønsker ”å ekspandere til Nilen og Eufrat,” og at de ser ”fremover mot nye erobringer” og at deres ”renkespill har blitt utlagt i Sions Eldste protokoller..” Sions Eldste protokoller er et forfalsket dokument. Tydeligvis er ikke Hamas opptatt av historisk vitenskap eller sannhet, kun sin egen ”sannhet.”


Om Jødene

Ifølge Hamas har jødene brukt sin rikdom til ”å ta kontroll over mediene i verden”; ”oppmuntre til revolusjoner i ulike deler av verden for å fremme sine interesser og etterpå plukke opp fruktene,” som blant annet ”den franske og den russiske revolusjon”; ”etablere hemmelige organisasjoner som nå er spredt over hele jorden for å ødelegge samfunn og fremme sionistiske interesser” som for eksempel ”frimurerne”; ”få kontroll over de imperialistiske statene og fikk dem til å kolonisere mange land for å få kontroll over rikdommene i disse”; ”sto bak første verdenskrig i den hensikt å fjerne Det islamske kalifat”; ”sto også bak andre verdenskrig”; ”oppmuntret til opprettelsen av De forente nasjoner og Sikkerhetsrådet for å erstatte Nasjonenes forbund, og for å styre verden ved hjelp av mellommenn. Det brøt ikke ut noen krig uten at deres fingermerker var der…Imperialismens hærstyrker, både i det kapitalistiske Vesten og i de kommunistiske landene i øst, støtter på skift fienden med all sin makt, både med menneskelige og materielle ressurser. Når islam kommer på banen, forener alle vantroens styrker seg for å stoppe den fordi vantroens folk opptrer i fellesskap.”


Referanse:

Al-Banna, H. (1928). Jihad. I: Jihad Watch (2008).

FNs Utviklingsprogram (2006)

Humphrey, N. (1998). What shall we tell the children? Social Research, 65, 777-805.

Jihad Watch (2007). Jihad Summer Camp!

Koranen

Stern, J. (2004). Terror In the Name of God.

Hamas Covenant (1988). I: The Avalon Project (2008)

The Investigative Project on Terrorism (2009). An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Brotherhood in North America.

Wikipedia (2008). British Mandate of Palestine.

Wikipedia (2008b). Oslo Accords.

Winn, D. (2000). The Manipulated Mind.

Thursday, June 3, 2010

Just War Theory


Just War Theory (or Bellum Iustum) is an ethical theory of warfare. War can be defined as an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities. Thus, fisticuffs between individual persons do not count as a war, nor does a gang fight.

War occurs between political communities, defined as those entities which either are states or intend to become states. Terrorist organizations might also be considered “political communities”, if they are associations of people with a political purpose or they control an area in which they function as the de facto government (e.g. Hamas in the Gaza strip).

The origin of just war thinking is a synthesis of classical Greco-Roman and Christian values. The triad of Aristotle, Cicero and Augustine is considered the founders of the just war tradition. Many of the rules developed by the just war tradition have since been codified into contemporary international laws governing armed conflict, such as The United Nations Charter and The Hague and Geneva Conventions.

Just war theory offers moral rules to guide decision-makers on the appropriateness of their conduct during the resort to war, conduct during war, and the termination of the war. Its over-all aim is to try and ensure that wars are begun only for defensible reasons, that when wars break out they are fought in a responsibly controlled and targeted manner, and that the parties to the dispute bring their war to an end in a speedy and responsible fashion that respects the requirements of justice.

The just war theory can be divided onto three parts:
1. Jus ad Bellum – the justice of resorting to war.
2. Jus in Bello – the justice of conduct within war.
3. Jus post Bellum – the justice of the termination of war.


JUS AD BELLUM

The rules of just ad bellum are addressed, first and foremost, to the responsible authorities, those who inaugurate war, most often the head of state and other political leaders. If the leaders fail their responsibility to jus ad bellum principles, then they commit war crimes. Aggressive leaders who launch unjust wars commit crimes against peace. What constitutes a just or unjust use of armed force is disclosed by the rules of jus ad bellum. Just war theory contends that, for any resort to war to be justified, a political community must fulfill each and every one of the requirements:

1. Just Cause: a political community may launch a war only for the right reason. The just causes include: self-defense from external attack; the defense of others from external attack; the protection of innocents from brutal, aggressive regimes; and punishment for a grievous wrongdoing which remains uncorrected.

2. Right Intention: the state must intend to fight the war only for the sake of its just cause. Having the right reason for launching a war is not enough: the actual motivation behind the resort to war must also be morally appropriate. Ulterior motives, such as a power or land grab, or irrational motives, such as revenge or ethnic hatred, are ruled out.

3. Proper authority and public declaration: A state may go to war only if the decision has been made by the appropriate authorities, according to the proper process, and made public, notably to its own citizens and to the enemy state(s). The “appropriate authority” is usually specified in that country's constitution.

4. Last Resort: a state may resort to war only if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in question, such as diplomatic negotiation. Make sure something war is declared only when it seems the last practical and reasonable shot at effectively resisting aggression.

5. Probability of Success: a state may not resort to war if it can foresee that doing so will have no measurable impact on the situation. The aim here is to block mass violence which is going to be futile. Unless you are attacked first, fighting in self-defense.

6. Proportionality: a state must, prior to initiating a war, weigh the universal goods expected to result from it, such as securing the just cause, against the universal evils expected to result, notably casualties. Only if the benefits are proportional to, or “worth”, the costs may the war action proceed. (The universal must be stressed, since often in war states only tally their own expected benefits and costs, radically discounting those accruing to the enemy and to any innocent third parties.)


JUS IN BELLO

Jus in bello refers to justice in war, to right conduct in the midst of battle. Responsibility for state adherence to jus in bello norms falls primarily on the shoulders of those military commanders, officers and soldiers who formulate and execute the war policy of a particular state. They are to be held responsible for any breach of the principles. Such accountability may involve being put on trial for war crimes, whether by one's own national military justice system or the International Criminal Court.

We should distinguish between external and internal jus in bello. External jus in bello concerns the rules a state should observe regarding the enemy and its armed forces. Internal jus in bello concerns the rules a state must follow in connection with its own people as it fights war against an external enemy. There are several rules of external jus in bello:

1. No Means Mala in Se: soldiers may not use weapons or methods which are evil in themselves. These include: mass rape campaigns; genocide or ethnic cleansing; using poison or treachery (like disguising soldiers to look like the Red Cross); forcing captured soldiers to fight against their own side; and using weapons whose effects cannot be controlled, like biological agents. Soldiers must obey all international laws on weapons prohibition. Weapons of Mass Destruction or ACB (atomic, chemical, biological) weapons are forbidden. One reason is because they are indiscriminate.

2. Non-Combatant Immunity: soldiers are only entitled to use their (non-prohibited) weapons to target those who are engaged in harm. Thus, when they take aim, soldiers must discriminate between the civilian population, which is morally immune from direct and intentional attack, and those legitimate military, political and industrial targets involved in rights-violating harm. While some collateral civilian casualties are excusable, it is wrong to take deliberate aim at civilian targets.

3. Proportionality: soldiers may only use force proportional to the end they seek. They must restrain their force to that amount appropriate to achieving their aim or target. Weapons of mass destruction, for example, are usually seen as being out of proportion to legitimate military ends.

4. Treatment of POWs: if enemy soldiers surrender and become captives, they cease being lethal threats to basic rights. They are no longer “engaged in harm.” Thus it is wrong to target them with cruel and unusual punishment, such as death, starvation, rape, torture, medical experimentation, etc. They are to be provided with benevolent – not malevolent – and humane – not derogating – quarantine away from battle zones and until the war ends, when they should be exchanged for one's own prisoners of war (POWs).

5. No reprisals: a reprisal is when country A violates jus in bello in war with country B. Country B then retaliates with its own violation of jus in bello, seeking to chasten A into obeying the rules. There are strong moral and evidentiary reasons to believe that reprisals don't work, and they instead serve to escalate death and make the destruction of war increasingly indiscriminate. Winning well is the best revenge.

Internal jus in bello means that a state involved in a war, still needs to respect the human rights of its own citizens as best it can during the crisis. The following issues arise: is it just to impose conscription, or press censorship? Can one curtail traditional civil liberties, and due process protections, for perceived gains in national security? Should elections be cancelled or postponed? May soldiers disobey orders, e.g. refuse to fight in wars they believe unjust? A comprehensive theory of wartime justice must include consideration of them, and not merely focus on what one may do to the enemy. Some of the worst atrocities in wartime have occurred within, and not between, national borders. Some states have used the cloak of war with foreign powers to engage in massive internal human rights violations, usually against some disfavored group. Other states, otherwise moral, in the panic amidst the wartime situation, have imposed emergency legislation which has been a complete overkill, product of fear rather than reason.


JUS POST BELLUM

Jus post bellum refers to justice during the third and final stage of war: termination. It seeks to regulate the ending of wars; the transition from war to peace.

1. Proportionality and Publicity: the peace settlement should be measured and reasonable, as well as publicly proclaimed. To make a settlement serve as an instrument of revenge is to commit a crime against peace.

2. Rights Vindication: any peace agreement should secure the basic human rights of both parties, including individual’s rights to life and liberty, and communities entitlements to territory and sovereignty.

3. Discrimination: distinction needs to be made between the leaders, the soldiers, and the civilians in the defeated country. Civilians are entitled to reasonable immunity from punitive post-war measures. This rule out sweeping socio-economic sanctions.

4. Punishment: when the defeated country has been a blatant, rights-violating aggressor, proportionate punishment must be meted out. The leaders, in particular, should face fair and public international trials for war crimes. Soldiers that have committed war crimes, from all sides of the conflict, should be held accountable to investigation and possible trial.

5. Compensation: financial restitution may be mandated, subject to both proportionality and discrimination. There needs to be enough resources left so that the defeated country can begin its own reconstruction. To beggar thy neighbor is to pick future fights.

6. Rehabilitation: the port-war environment provides a promising opportunity to reform decrepit institutions in an aggressor regime. Such reforms are permissible but they must be proportional to the degree of depravity in the regime.

There needs to be an ethical exit strategy from war, and it deserves at least as much thought and effort as the purely military exit strategy so much on the minds of policy planners and commanding officers. Any serious defection, by any participant, from these principles of just war settlement should be seen as a violation of the rules of just war termination, and so should be punished. At the least, violation of such principles mandates a new round of diplomatic negotiations – even binding international arbitration – between the relevant parties to the dispute. At the very most, such violation may give the aggrieved party a just cause – but no more than a just cause – for resuming hostilities. Full recourse to the resumption of hostilities may be made only if all the other traditional criteria of jus ad bellum – proportionality, last resort, etc. – are satisfied in addition to just cause.

Can coercive regime change ever be justified, or is it essentially an act of imperialism? Forcible post-war regime change can be permissible provided: 1) the war itself was just and conducted properly; 2) the target regime was illegitimate, thus forfeiting its state rights; 3) the goal of the reconstruction is a minimally just regime; and 4) respect for human rights is integral to the transformation process itself. The permission is then granted because the transformation: 1) violates neither state nor human rights; 2) its expected consequences are very desirable, namely, satisfied human rights for the local population and increased international peace and security for everyone; and 3) the post-war moment is promising regarding the possibilities for reform. The transformation will be successful when there's: 1) a stable new regime; 2) run entirely by locals; which is 3) minimally just. There is extensive historical evidence that this kind of success probably takes from 8 to 12 years to achieve. Successful, rights-respecting coercive regime change can be done and was done in Germany and Japan from 1945-55, and so it is neither conceptually nor empirically impossible. However, it's very difficult and, in some cases, it's not a wise thing to do. Recommended steps for transforming a defeated regime include the following:

1. Adhere diligently to the laws of war during the regime take-down and occupation.
2. Require the regime, as a term of its treaty of surrender, to adopt a political form of government that is democratic and with a constitution that protects the basic human rights of all citizens.
3. Prosecute war criminals.
4. Disarm and demilitarize the society.
5. Provide effective military and police security for the whole country.
6. Remove propaganda from the educational curricula.
7. Forego compensation and sanctions in favor of investing in and re-building the economy.
8. Follow an orderly, not-too-hasty exit strategy when the new regime can stand on its own feet.


Reference:

Cook, M. (2004). The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military. New York: State University of New York Press.

Moseley, A. (2006). Just War. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Orend, B. (2005). War. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Walzer, M. (2006). Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. (4. Ed.). New York: Basic Books.